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Abstract
The Vietnamese envoys’ records during their diplomatic journeys to Beijing, especially 
poems and prose, have attracted increasing academic attention, from both international 
and local scholars. Some studies have comprehensively examined the Vietnamese en-
voys’ routes when visiting China, literary works, diplomatic strategies, and Confucian 
beliefs, such as the Taiwanese scholar Chen Yiyuan’s (陳益源) journal paper, which 
specifically problematizes the absence of filial expression related to the envoys’ journey 
in Xiaogan (孝感), Hubei Province. The systematic works of Liam C. Kelley and Peng 
Qian (彭茜) chiefly delineate the harmonious and normal communication based upon 
the long-developed cultural congruity between Vietnam and China. Their studies and 
other relevant research show the sophisticated impact of Chinese Confucianism on the 
Vietnamese envoys. However, there is so far insufficient investigation into the official 
representatives’ transformation and violation of Confucian manners and thoughts at spe-
cific historical moments. Hence, this paper intends to specify the practices of Confucian 
discourses in the final negotiation between the states of the Nguyễn and the Qing in 1883, 
both of which encountered the military threat from France and other Western countries. 
Our findings suggest that although those last envoys, including Phạm Thận Duật and 
Nguyễn Thuật, utilised a Sinocentric and Confucian manner to bargain with the Chi-
nese for military aid, overall the Nguyễn adopted a Machiavellian approach instead. This 
means there was a division between political utility and ritual ethics, and the Vietnamese 
envoys, as pragmatic politicians, prioritized national security while discussing military 
aid in terms of Confucian rhetoric and values.
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Vietnamska konfucijanska diplomatska tradicija ter dopisovanje med za-
dnjimi predkolonialnimi odposlanci vladavine Nguyễn in Li Hongzhangom
Izvleček 
Mednarodna in domača akademska skupnost čedalje večjo pozornost posvečata zapisom 
vietnamskih odposlancev, še posebej poeziji in prozi, ki so nastajali med njihovimi diplo-
matskimi potovanji v Peking. Avtorji so se v posameznih študijah osredotočili na poti, po 
katerih so potovali vietnamski odposlanci po kitajskem ozemlju, različna literarna dela, 
diplomatske strategije in konfucijanske ideje. Te še posebej izpostavi tajvanski učenjak 
Chen Yiyuan (陳益源), ki v svoji razpravi problematizira odsotnost poslušnosti in spo-
štovanja starejših na potovanju odposlancev v Xiaogan (孝感) v provinci Hubei. Liam 
C. Kelley in Peng Qiang (彭茜) sistematično prikažeta običajno harmonično komunika-
cijo, temelječo na kulturni skladnosti med Vietnamom in Kitajsko, ki se je oblikovala v 
daljšem zgodovinskem obdobju. Tovrstne študije sicer podrobno prikažejo sofisticiran 
vpliv kitajskega konfucianizma na vietnamske odposlance, a hkrati je še vedno premalo 
raziskav o uradnih predstavnikih in njihovih transformacijah ter kršenju konfucijanskih 
načel in idej v specifičnih zgodovinskih trenutkih. Članek zato poskuša prikazati prakse 
konfucijanskega diskurza v zadnjih pogajanjih med vladavino Nguyễn in dinastijo Qing 
leta 1883, ko sta se obe državi soočali z vojaškimi grožnjami Francije in drugih zahodnih 
dežel. Kljub temu da so zadnji odposlanci, kot na primer Phạm Thận Duật in Nguyễn 
Thuật, sinocentrična in konfucijanska načela uporabili kot metodo za uspešno pogajanje s 
kitajsko stranjo za vojaško pomoč, je Nguyễn namesto tega raje prevzel machiavellistični 
pristop. To kaže na razcep med politično koristjo in ritualno etiko, pri čemer so vietnam-
ski odposlanci kot pragmatični politiki v kontekstu konfucijanske retorike in vrednot pri 
pogajanjih o vojaški pomoči prednostno obravnavali nacionalno varnost.
Ključne besede: vietnamska konfucijanska diplomatska tradicija, zadnji predkolonial-
ni odposlanci vladavine Nguyễn, sinocentrizem, Nguyễn Thuật, Phạm Thận Duật, Li 
Hongzhang
The Vietnamese envoys’ records during their diplomatic journeys to Beijing, 
especially poems and prose, have attracted increasing academic attention, from 
both international and local scholars. There has been scholarship that compre-
hensively examines the Vietnamese envoys’ routes when visiting in China, liter-
ary works, diplomatic strategies, and Confucian beliefs, such as the Taiwanese 
scholar Chen Yiyuan’s (陳益源) journal paper Vietnamese Envoys and Xiaogan 
(Qindai Yuenan shijie yu Xiaogan 清代越南使節與孝感) (2015), which specif-
ically problematizes the absence of filial expression related to the envoys’ jour-
ney in Xiaogan 孝感, Hubei Province. Other systematic works, such as Liam C. 
Kelley’s monograph Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vi-
etnamese Relationship (2005) and Peng Qian’s (彭茜) master’s thesis “Tribute 
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and Literary Exchange: The Study of Vietnamese Envoys to China in the Qing 
dynasty and Guangxi” (“Chaogong guanxi yu wenxue jiaoliu: Qingdai Yuenan 
yu Guangxi yanjiu 朝貢關係與文學交流：清代越南來華使臣與廣西研究”) 
(2014) chiefly delineated the harmonious and normal communication based upon 
the long-developed cultural congruity between Vietnam and China. Their studies 
and other relevant research show the sophisticated impact of Chinese Confucian-
ism on the Vietnamese envoys. However, there have been insufficient investiga-
tions into the official representatives’ transformation and violation of Confucian 
manners and thoughts at specific historical moments. 
This paper, based on an illustration of the diplomatic norms of Vietnam in peace, 
thus intends to specify the superficial practices of Confucian discourses in the 
final negotiation in 1883 between the states of the Nguyễn and the Qing, both 
of which encountered the military threat from France and other Western coun-
tries. It genealogically clarifies the diplomatic dilemma between subordinating 
to the sovereign state and prioritizing unethical concerns that especially annoyed 
the pre-colonial Nguyễn politicians in the late nineteenth century. The following 
sections of this study will examine the Sinocentrism of Lý Văn Phức’s (李文馥) 
(1785–1849), the most studied Vietnamese envoy, as an introduction to tracing 
the multifarious sources of Nguyễn diplomatic approaches, and then turn to the 
written records related to the last Nguyễn precolonial envoys’ mission and meet-
ing with Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) (1823–1901), the then diplomatic representative 
of the Qing government. A contextual investigation of the diplomatic tensions 
among France, China, and Vietnam will assist in the exploration of individual 
concerns under the Confucian diplomatic tradition.
Lý Văn Phức, and the Confucian Diplomatic Tradition of Vietnam
Lý Văn Phức argued against Qing local officers who claimed that Vietnam should 
belong to the civilizational system of China (Hua 華), instead of following the 
ways of barbarian and backward others (Yi 夷). As he wrote in Miscellaneous 
Lyrics of the Fujian Journey (Minxing zayong 閩行雜詠), 
In 1831, there was an envoy from Vietnam (Lý Văn Phức himself). He 
received orders such as escorting lost officers due to typhoon, and hence 
had to visit Fujian. On 20 August, he arrived at the front door of the 
official mansion of the provincial capital, and saw a title “The Vietnam-
ese Official Mansion for the Barbarian Envoys” (Yuenan Yishi Gonggu-
an 粵南夷使公館). The mansion was next to the Fujian County office, 
so the title was given by the County Head Huang Zhaizhong (黃宅中). 
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I came, and said “I am not a barbarian, so I would not enter this mansion 
for barbarians.” The accompanying officer cut up the sign, and then we 
entered. The Head Huang heard this, came immediately, and informed 
the accompanying officer of his coming. Head Huang is a second-grade 
imperial scholars.1 He initially did not know this, but then earnestly 
thanked us and corrected the title to “The Vietnamese Official Mansion 
for the National Envoys” (Yuenan Guoshiguan Gongguan 粵南國使官
公館). The envoy worried that the people did not have a full understand-
ing, so he wrote “Argument against Yi” (Bian Yi 辯夷) and showed it in 
the mansion. (Lý 2010, 257–58)
The title of the mansion reveals two binary and opposing perspectives of identi-
fying Vietnam. Lý Văn Phức complained about Qing officers’ mis-recognition of 
Vietnam as Yi, and in his nearly 800-word essay “Argument against Yi” (1831), 
he attempted to assimilate Vietnam with China through genealogically illustrating 
its Confucian tradition with the key features of each Chinese dynasty (Lý 2010, 
258–62).2 In a modern theoretical understanding, he consolidated a hierarchical 
binary opposition and assigned subaltern Vietnam to the more powerful side. His 
reverse use of, what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2010, 2115) terms, “epistemic 
violence”, which is originally used to illustrate the West’s hegemonic constitution 
of the colonial subject as Other, validated the authority and superiority of the Vi-
etnamese regime in Southeast Asia. This corresponds to Lý Văn Phức’s personal 
background and the development of the “Small China” concept in Vietnam. 
In his journal paper “Between Fujian and Vietnam––Taking the Vietnamese En-
voy Lý Văn Phức as an example” (Zai Minnan yu Yuenan zhijian – Yi Yuenan 
shijie Li Wenfu jiazu wei li 在閩南與越南之間 – 以越南使節李文馥家族為例), 
Chen Yiyuan derives Lý Văn Phức’s Chinese origin from his genealogy. He found 
1 The original term is “erjia jinshi” 二甲進士. According to Iona Man-Cheong’s summary of the 
grading of the palace examination for selecting civil servants, the cohort of metropolitan degree 
holders was divided into three grades. “The top grade (yi jia, also called jinshi jidi; meaning ‘rank-
ing presented scholar’) contained only three graduates. The second grade (er jia, also called jinshi 
chushen; ‘of presented scholar background’) was of no fixed number, and usually contained many 
more graduates than the first grade but fewer than the third grade (san jia, also tong jinshi chushen; 
‘equal to presented scholar background’), which contained the highest number of graduates.” (Iona 
2004, 245) 
2 In “Argument against Yi”, Lý Văn Phức wrote about Vietnam: “Using words to manage the legal 
system is based on two emperors and three kings. Using words to establish traditions is based on 
six classical works and four philosophical works (of Confucianism). It dwells in Confucius and 
Mencius, and settles in the Cheng-Zhu school. Its origin of scholarship is The Commentary of Zuo 
and The Annals of the Warring States, and then Ban Gu and Sima Qian.” (Lý 2010, 258–62) And 
then from the Han dynasty to the Ming dynasty, he listed out Vietnam’s compliance with Chinese 
writing, calligraphy, painting, civil servant examination system, clothing, and so on (ibid.). 
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that Lý was a sixth-generation Vietnamese Chinese, whose ancestor Lý Khắc 
Liêm 李克廉 was Viceroy of Yunnan in the Ming dynasty but, due to the rise of 
the Qing Empire, turned to serve the Lê dynasty of Vietnam with a hereditary title 
(Chen 2016, 4–5). Although most of the married wives of the Hanoi Lý family 
were not Chinese (nor ethnic Chinese settled in Vietnam) (ibid., 6) the family 
members kept a Confucian tradition, which the high culture Vietnamese gover-
nors had long adopted to maintain ethical stability. Their transitional compliance 
with Vietnam’s local Confucianism was welcome and, meanwhile, consolidated 
the national sense of being a “little China”, recognized as superior to the vassal 
others, and also to the Western nations who arrived later on. As Liam C. Kelly 
explains, the “little China” theory
argues that during the millennium that Vietnam was part of various Chi-
nese empires (the conventional dating being 111 BC–939 AD), it be-
came a miniature replica of China, and that it was precisely through its 
contact with the larger kingdom, and by adopting many of its customs 
and political institutions, that Vietnam was subsequently able to main-
tain its autonomy for the next thousand years until the advent of French 
colonization in the nineteenth century. (Kelly 2005, 9)
This theory supposes that the geopolitical connection to an Asian superpower 
and relevant ritual inertia granted Vietnam specific political authority. Yu Ping 
禹平 and Xiao Keyi 肖可意 more concretely illustrate the idea of “little China” 
in the Qing context. They note that Vietnam had never claimed itself to be “little 
China”, and this concept was first suggested by Korea with the intention to “dis-
tinguish Korea, which followed Confucian philosophy and the Chinese ritual sys-
tem (Hua), from the ‘barbarian’ (Yi) Qing regime” (Yu and Xiao 2018, 137). For 
instance, the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mạng (1791–1841) regarded the Qing 
polity as transforming Yi into Hua, and its ritual establishment as inferior to Vi-
etnam, the self-identified Southern counterpart of China (ibid., 137–38).3 He im-
plicitly despised Qing’s Hua and deemed his Hua a more valid and representative 
entity that could re-educate the Qing state and subjugate other Southeast Asian 
states (ibid., 134, 138).
Migrating from China to “little China”, Lý Văn Phức’s ancestor held an ambig-
uous cultural belonging to the already collapsed Ming China and to similarly 
feudal Lê Vietnam. Lý Khắc Liêm preferred Kinh’s Hua to the Manchurian Hua. 
3 As Yu Ping and Xiao Keyi states, “in the history, Vietnam generally called China the ‘Northern 
Dynasty (beichao 北朝])’ and itself the ‘Southern Dynasty (nanchao 南朝)’” (Yu and Xiao 2018, 
137). Vietnam was sharing an ambiguous belonging to China with the China of the sovereign 
regimes. 
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As the descendant of Vietnam’s sovereign state, which was later regarded as an 
inferior political successor of Confucian etiquette, Lý Văn Phức held and advo-
cated a belief in the centrality of Vietnamese Hua, against the peripheral Yi. This 
imaginatively supported the validity of Vietnamese civilization regardless of the 
ethnic differences between Chinese, Vietnamese, and Vietnamese Chinese / Chi-
nese Vietnamese. Lý’s Sinocentrism beyond personal identity is transnational, 
but not necessarily trans-dynastic and trans-ethnic. It suggests that Ming’s Han 
rulers and Nguyễn’s Kinh rulers inherited the same cultural heritage from the ide-
ally imagined past, whereas Qing’s Manchurian rulers failed. Lý only represented 
the side of Nguyễn’s successful inheritance in “Argument against Yi”, hiding the 
potential disagreement with Qing civilization. 
In 1868, 37 years after Lý Văn Phức wrote “Argument against Yi”, the Vietnam-
ese envoy Nguyễn Tư Giản 阮思僴 read The Atlas of Guangxi (Yuexi diyu tushuo 
粵西地輿圖說), published in Guangxi, while visiting Qing China. He found the 
marking of Vietnam as Yi in it, and hence wrote “On identifying Yi” (Bian Yi shuo 
辨夷說) with regard to his hope: “Concerning the word ‘Yi’, I hope those who 
mention it shall promptly make a change, so that fairness can be openly achieved 
and we can regain a good relationship.” (Nguyễn 2010, 234) It was the time after 
the diplomatic failure of Lý Văn Phức in negotiating with France, the inferior 
Other in his gaze, had led to the insistence of the Emperors Minh Mạng, Thiệu 
Trị and Tự Đức on taking measures to protect their Hua culture from French 
intervention, such as executing control over the growing Catholic communities 
and imprisoning Western missionaries. However, those measures only acceler-
ated French occupation of Indochina. The political and diplomatic weakness of 
Vietnam did not undermine its harmonious approach in arguing for its cultural 
supremacy. The writing of Lý Văn Phức and Nguyễn Tư Giản, as a formal, polite 
and appropriate approach to conceptually negotiate with the Confucian intellec-
tuals of other states, echoes the Confucian diplomatic tradition of feudal Vietnam 
that contemporary Vietnamese scholars have described positively. 
Trần Ngọc Thêm (2001, 544–22) argues that diplomatic policies are closely relat-
ed to the core national culture. Hence, the agricultural nature of Vietnam, which 
formed a collectivist and sentimental lifestyle, would tend to take a friendly ap-
proach towards other nations, and to avoid confrontation and wars. Trần Trọng 
Phiến (2011, 26–27) suggested that the Vietnamese people had been actively de-
veloping diplomatic relations with other groups for a long time. In 2357 BC it 
had the first recorded diplomatic connection with China: the Duke of Zhou 周公 
giving the Vietnamese a south-pointing carriage. Then, whenever there was foun-
dation of a new dynasty, the new Vietnamese ruler would initiate a connection 
with the neighbouring nations, especially China, such as Lý Thái Tổ’s 李太祖 
219Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 213–232
assignment of envoys to the Song court for diplomatic acceptance in 1010 AD, 
soon after his enthronement. 
There was a flexible Confucian way that Vietnamese rulers had long followed to 
sustain their political and ideological validity. Phan Ngọc (潘玉) (2013) explains 
that Vietnam regarded itself internally an empire and externally as a kingdom, 
complying with the hierarchical order of its vassal-sovereign relation with China. 
Its national spirit was patriotic, independent and autonomous, with an emphasis 
on ren 仁 and yi 義, denoting a righteous respect even to its military enemies. 
Towards China, its sovereign state, Vietnam declared and practiced its subordi-
nation in response to the Confucian principle that grants the senior an absolute 
power over the junior. Towards the vassal states of Vietnam, such as Lao and 
Cambodia, Vietnam used constant conciliation, instead of military intimidation, 
as the key approach to keeping peace (Phạm 2015, 15; Lê 2015, 33–34). In the 
view of Đinh Xuân Lâm and Vũ Trường Giang (2014, 3–10), Vietnam shared 
the same ideological centre as China, regarding the surrounding nations as un-
civilized and barbarian, and applied a friendly attitude and strict courtesy to both 
its sovereign and vassal states. As the details provided by Nguyễn Thị Mỹ Hạnh 
(2016) show, the Vietnamese rulers of all dynasties were very careful about send-
ing envoys to other nations in order to build and maintain harmonious relations. 
The selected envoys needed to have passed the civil service examination, with 
the syllabus based on the Confucian classics, such as the Classic of Poetry and 
the Analects.4 They had to present certain aspects of the Confucian ethos, through 
creative writing and interpersonal communication, on behalf of the Vietnamese 
court (Nguyễn 2016, 58). 
From the perspective of Vietnamese scholars, even if there were wars, ancient Vi-
etnamese decision-makers would prioritize amity despite the possibility of taking 
military offense, as Confucianism permits (Yu 2010, 97).5 This  approach could 
4 Doh Chull Shin, To-ch’ol Sin, and To-ch’ŏl Sin (2012) illustrate the spread of Confucianism in 
ancient Vietnam, during which the civil service examinations, introduced from China, signifi-
cantly functioned: “After Vietnam became independent from China in 939 AD, the influence of 
Confucianism grew. As Vietnamese kings and aristocrats struggled to bring order to their unruly 
kingdom, they embraced the Confucian philosophy emphasizing social harmony and political or-
der. (…) (I)n 1075, civil service examinations in the Confucian classics were introduced. In 1076, 
the first Vietnamese University was established next to the Temple of Confucius. For the first time 
in the history of Vietnam, Confucianism began to share a place at the royal court with Buddhism.” 
(Shin, Sin and Sin 2018, 35)
5 Yu Kam-por’s journal paper “Confucian Views on War as Seen in the Gongyang Commentary on 
the Spring and Autumn Annals” suggests that Confucianism “sheds light on war against enemies 
of civilization, conditions for waging a preemptive war, punitive expedition, as well as the use of 
weapons of mass destruction.” It summarized Confucian understanding of war as realistic, prag-
matic, but humanistic (Yu 2010, 97).
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maintain peace between states, and meanwhile minimize the casualties of both 
sides and the disturbance to the public. Trần Trọng Kim (2018) notes that, in 
982, the Lê army defeated the Song army, but soon initiated reconciliation with 
the Song court. Besides, in 1479, the Lao army harassed the Vietnamese at the 
border between Lao and Vietnam. Lê sent some troops and chased the Lao army 
back to the border of Myanmar. Despite winning an absolute victory, the Lê army 
did not take that chance to occupy Lao, but instead retreated in order to repair 
the relationship with Lao (Trần 2018, 272). Moreover, Trần Trọng Phiến (2011) 
argues that, no matter whether in the wars for independence or for protecting na-
tional sovereignty, the Vietnamese rulers would focus on expelling the enemies 
from their land, rather than killing them. For example, in 1077, after the Lý army 
defeated the Song army, the general Lý Thường Kiệt (李常傑) did not insist on 
annihilating them. Instead he chose to use diplomatic methods to persuade them 
to unarm (ibid., 28). 
In the views of contemporary Vietnamese scholars, Vietnamese diplomacy was 
Confucian at this time in the sense that it submissively guaranteed the structural 
stability of the hierarchical power orders of Asia, with a ritual appropriation of 
communication and a humanitarian concern about civilian life. However, such 
views only reflect the optimistic and ideal aspects of Confucian practices. As 
many scholars have noted, Confucianism is too rigid to mediate between inner 
desire and formal etiquette. For instance, Wu Sen (吳森) complains that over-rit-
ualization in the Confucian culture had repressed genuine expression of feeling 
and led to insincere communication (Wu 1995, 55–98). Therefore, both the his-
torical records and scholarly discourse that arose under the influence of Confu-
cianism might not show the potential duality of political decisions. The discursive 
rhetoric used to safeguard the individual and collective dignity would overshad-
ow the pragmatic concerns and methods that conflict with Confucian discipline. 
Another issue that deserves attention is the interior compatibility and practical 
constraints of Confucian philosophy. As Li Chenyang asks, “If Confucianism 
promotes both harmony and ritual propriety, how does it bring them in tune?” 
(Li 2013, 128). He answers that classic Confucians had flexibility to resolve the 
incompatibilities between maintaining ritual correctness and sustaining peace-
ful situations through stressing the idea of “weighting”.6 However, although it 
6 Li Chenyang illustrated that “One way to see such flexibility is to examine the notion of quan (權), 
or discretional action. The word originally means a weighing instrument (cheng 秤) or the weight 
used in such an instrument (cheng tuo 秤鉈). By extension, it also means the act of weighing. 
From this sense of weighing comes the meaning of quan as discretion. Quan as discretional action 
is a skill of making appropriate decisions with considered flexibility to suit specific situations. As 
such, it means situational decisions with discretion. The notion of quan is important in Confu-
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is correct, as Li would agree, that discretional action can flexibly apply general 
Confucian rules in specific situations for the best outcome, the practical needs 
(or at least temptations) of taking contingency plans out of Confucian acceptance 
should not be underestimated. Moreover, the idea of weighting could encoun-
ter challenges when applied in actual political dilemmas. Self-established as an 
orthodox Confucian regime, the Nguyễn court regarded the rulers of both Qing 
and France as barbarians. It did not share the same high-cultural value system 
as the Qing dynasty, the failed successor of Confucianism, or the French, the 
uncivilized invaders. In the final negotiation between the Nguyễn and Qing to 
safeguard the autonomy of Vietnam from the French military actions, Nguyễn 
officers did not show a belief in the Qing court’s willingness to fulfil Confu-
cian requirements, such as protecting vassal states. Simultaneously, they were 
not faithful to their sovereign state, keeping their national plight a secret until the 
country needed Qing aid. The following sections will first provide some details 
about the last Nguyễn envoys’ visits to Tianjin before the French colonization of 
Vietnam, and then connect the patriotic personal statement of a representative 
envoy, Nguyễn Thuật (阮述) (1842–1911), to the textual communication7 with a 
Confucian attitude between the Vietnamese envoys and Li Hongzhang. There is 
thus the intention to explore the practical discordance between the ideal Confu-
cian diplomatic tradition and the pragmatic use of Confucian rhetoric for certain 
political purposes. 
The Final Diplomatic Trip of Nguyễn Envoys to China 
The Annals No. 4 Vol. 68 of The Principal Veritable Records of the Great South 
(Đại Nam Thực Lục Chính Biên 大南寔錄正編) documented that, in December 
1882, the last precolonial emperor Tự Đức 嗣德 (1829–1883) 
assigned Phạm Thận Duật 范慎遹 (1825–1885), the Minister of Justice 
(Xingbu Shangshu 刑部尚書), as Imperial Envoy (Qinchai Dachen 欽差
大臣) and Nguyễn Thuật, the Deputy Minister with the title of Assistant 
cian philosophy. Mencius said, for instance, ‘quan first, then one knows the light and the heavy; 
measure first, then one knows the long and the short’ (Mencius 1A7; TTC 2670–1). For matters of 
importance, we should ‘weigh’ the situation before action and then act accordingly. In Confucian 
texts, this word implies maintaining a flexible attitude toward existing rules in performing particu-
lar actions.” (Li 2013, 128)
7 Liu Yujun 劉玉珺 stated that “Han text is only the official written language of Vietnam. It cannot 
penetrate daily communication. Therefore, Vietnamese intellectuals all know Han text, but most of 
them could not use Han language to directly exchange ideas. They can only communicate through 
textual chats.” (Liu 2007, 362)
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Administrator (Shilang jia Can Zhi Xian 侍郎加參知銜), as Deputy Im-
perial Envoy (Fushi 副使), sending them to Tianjin of the Qing Empire 
for an official mission. (Xu and Xie 2000, 459) 
This was a response to the request of Li Hongzhang, the then Northern Commis-
sioner of Trade (Beiyang dachen 北洋大臣),8 to consult two to three Nguyễn 
officers about affairs between Vietnam and France. After signing the Treaty of 
Saigon (1862) and the Second Treaty of Saigon (1874)9 with France, the Nguyễn 
government had lost its sovereignty over Cochinchina. On the Qing side, Li 
Hongzhang would hope to prepare for Chinese-French-Vietnamese tripartite 
talks with Albert Bourée (the French ambassador in China from 1880 to 1883), 
in which the Vietnamese envoys might act as an information provider (Wang 
2013, 67).10 On the Nguyễn side, the two envoys expected the Qing government 
to mediate between France and Vietnam,11 and to offer naval aid for their coastal 
defence against the French military.12 As Nguyễn Thuật recorded in A Diary of 
Visiting Tianjin (Wang Jin riji 往津日記), which noted his thoughts on setting 
out for Hong Kong and Guangdong with Lê Đăng Trinh (黎登貞), Nguyễn Tịch 
(阮藉), and Đỗ Phú Túc (杜富肅), and the Qing officers Tang Jingsong (唐景崧) 
and Ma Fuyu (馬復賁) on 16 January 1883 (Nguyễn 1980, 19) to arriving at 
the Hòa Khiêm Hall (和謙殿) on 26 January 1884 (ibid., 64), the final hope of 
8 There were two superintendents of trade under the Foreign Affairs Office (Zongli Yamen 總理
衙門), the official organization (set up in 1861) in charge of all the foreign issues of the Qing Em-
pire: one for the Northern Ports as Northern Commissioner of Trade and the other for the Southern 
Ports as Southern Commissioner of Trade. They both “shared the responsibility over foreign and 
trade affairs of the northern and southern coastal areas.” (Li 2018, 144) The Northern one, held by 
Li Hongzhang from 1870 to 1901, overpowered the Southern one, intervening in the Vietnamese 
affairs. 
9 John Kleinen summarizes that the Second Treaty of Saigon was a revision of the first one. “This 
time the Court had to cede the whole of Cochinchina in the South to the French, opening the Red 
River to commerce and allowing the French to open consulates in Hanoi, Ninh Hai (near present 
day Haiphong) and Thi Nai (in the central province of Binh Dinh).” (Brocheux and Hemery in 
Kleinen 1999, 47)
10 Wang argued that Li Hongzhang flexibly turned the role of Vietnam as “participating in the 
negotiation” to “auditing for consultation”, so that France would accept the presence of Vietnamese 
delegates in the talk (Wang 2013, 67).
11 Nguyễn Thuật wrote during his Tianjin visit, “The Chinese court originally sent a document to 
assure its willingness to mediate for the affairs between my nation and France.” (Nguyễn 1980, 49) 
It turned out a disappointment as Nguyễn blamed that the Qing state could not fulfill the responsi-
bility of protecting his vassal state. 
12 As recorded in On Sino-French Vietnamese Negotiations 1875–1911 (Zhong Fa Yuenan jiaoshe 
Dang 1875–1911 中法越南交涉檔 1875–1911), Phạm Thận Duật told Li Hongzhang, as an im-
plicit request, “Only if the heavenly court (pointing to the Qing court) could send out battleships 
to help defend the pass, there could be no obstacles” (Guo 1962, 716).
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a nearly re-colonialized state failed due to Li Hongzhang’s ambiguous attitude. 
The interior weakness of China after the two Opium Wars (1839–1842; 1856–
1860) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) led to Li’s discreet maintenance 
of a sovereign-vassal connection. His tardiness in dealing with the sovereignty 
of Vietnam finally triggered France’s prompt military occupation of Huế, the 
capital of the Nguyễn dynasty from 1802 to 1945 (Zhang 2002, 534). The French 
victory, upon the death of Emperor Tự Đức on 19 July 1883, compelled the 
Vietnamese government to sign the Treaty of Huế on 25 August 1883, which 
recognized the French protectorate over Annam and Tonkin. On 4 September 
1883, the Vietnamese envoys had the second and also the last meeting with Li 
Hongzhang, explaining their especially difficult situation concerning the newly 
signed treaty (Nguyễn 1980, 50). On 12 November 1883, Li Hongzhang finally 
approved the Vietnamese envoys’ request to return to Vietnam, and ended their 
failed mission (ibid., 56). This marked a disconnection between two culturally 
Confucian entities. 
From the beginning to the end of the Tianjin journey, despite its failure, the Viet-
namese envoys maintained a Sinocentric and Confucian manner to bargain with 
the diplomatic representative of their most superior monarch. To a certain extent, 
they adopted a Machiavellian approach, here signifying a methodological divi-
sion between political utility and ritual ethics, the former of which was given 
highest priority. There is no intention to justify the reception and potential in-
fluence of Machiavellian thoughts in Nguyễn Vietnam, but merely to capture a 
corresponding key feature for elaboration instead. As Steven Forde summarizes,
Machiavelli develops the realist argument in its purest form, arguing that 
the nature of international politics absolves states of any moral duties 
whatsoever. He endorses imperialism, the unprovoked subjugation of 
weaker nations by stronger without reservation and without limit. He 
develops a new and amoral basis for the political community, to conform 
with the necessities of international politics as he sees them, and to re-
flect his negative assessment of the status of moral principle altogether. 
(Forde 1992, 64)
Vietnam was a vassal state, only imperialistic to its sub-vassal states, such as Lao, 
Cambodia, Thủy Xá and Hỏa Xá. However, toward its sovereign state it would 
also apply the Machiavellian mindset to bargain for maximal benefits, rather than 
absolutely obeying the “monarch”, as Confucian hierarchical ethics advocates. In 
the realm of international politics, rigid compliance with the rites and commands 
of the superior might restrict national authority. Hence, amorality with greater 
flexibility to make decisions is more preferable than ideological correctness. As 
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a real case, despite not necessarily disregarding morality, the Vietnamese en-
voys, as pragmatic politicians, would prioritize national security while utilizing 
Confucian rhetoric and values to negotiate with Li Hongzhang. Their twofold 
representation of political intention and discursive appropriation deserves much 
attention, as it reveals that the diplomatic tradition of a vassal state is not a ho-
mogeneously obedient unity in the context of global colonization. The cultural 
inertia originated from an ambiguous geographical understanding of Hua, a then 
currently disintegrating superpower, was simultaneously forming ideological 
sublimation and political dissidence. 
Nguyễn Thuật, Phạm Thận Duật and the Textual Negotiation with 
Li Hongzhang 
As one of the core Vietnamese representatives, Nguyễn Thuật expressed his deep 
patriotism and sentimental attachment to Vietnam through poetry. In his collec-
tion of poems Whenever Missing and Chanting the Grass (Meihuai yincao 每懷
吟草), there are verses written during his first journey to China, such as “Calcu-
lating the date of return / Desiring to exhaustively reward my nation in turn” and 
“Not tired of lingering for mornings and dusks / The leaving yachts long carried 
tomorrow’s missing” (Hồ 2017, 103).13 He utilized a literary form originating 
from Hua China to deliver proper utterances that suited his identity as an envoy. 
Examining his views shown in poems can reveal his perceptions of Vietnam-Chi-
na relations and provide a reference to his later compliance with a “barbarian” 
regime. 
In a nationalist sense, Nguyễn Thuật understood that Vietnam shared the same 
source and sustenance of civilization as the geographically identified China, but 
implicitly differentiated Qing China from the China of Han regimes. He knew 
that his visit required proper neighbourhood etiquette, so he “hope(d) to empha-
size the Han official rite” (ibid., 107–8).14 As a key word usually used to signify 
13 Two verses were quoted from the poems “Granted another annually promoted position as Assis-
tant Minister of Rites and Envoy in 1881 (Xinsi sui gong meng gaishou Li Bu Zuoshilang chong 
Zhengshi 辛巳歲貢蒙改授禮部左侍郎充正使)” and “Recently following a royal commend to 
create four poems with gonghe rhyme and the same rhyme that thanks Assistant Provincial Head 
of Ningming Luo Jinchi (Jinxing feng yuzhi si shi gonghe yuan yun ciyun chou Ningming Zhizhou 
Luo Jinchi 近行奉御制四詩恭和原韻 次韻酬寧明知州羅晉池)”, respectively.
14 Quoted from the poem “Answering to the five-word poem granted by Du Ciqing from the Ministry 
of Rites who walked me to the end of Royal River in the set-off day (Qixing ri Li Bu Du Ciqing 
songzhi Yu He kou zhan wuyan yi zeng, fu ci fengda 啟行日禮部杜次卿送至禦河口佔五言
以贈，夫此奉答)”.
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China, also in the verses such as “Thereafter, lyingly travelling across Han river 
islets thoroughly”, (ibid., 128–29)15 Han could have two meanings, related to the 
previously prosperous Han dynasty (202 BC–220 AD) and the Han people. This 
was a long overthrown regime and not a ruling class in Nguyễn Thuật’s era. How-
ever, he, in the poems responding to other officers, accented Vietnam’s pre-Qing 
inheritance of Han civilization: “The South of Yunnan (Vietnam) long using the 
same standards for roads and words” and “Situated as the same archived states” 
(ibid., 134–38).16 The far-reaching imagination of the regressionist ideal of Han 
was ambiguously denying the Qing Manchurian regime, which he regarded as 
failing to take its responsibility to save Vietnam, the culturally, but not ethnically 
nor geographically, valid descendant of Han. 
As an officer who later served the Nguyễn puppet government under French con-
trol until his death in 1911, Nguyễn Thuật’s Confucian manner could not be as 
straightforward as Lý Văn Phức presented. In Lý’s era, national power enabled 
the government, despite being subordinated to the Qing, to repress and expel the 
Westerners, whose nations were not authorized as valid by Confucian ceremo-
nies.17 However, due to the weakening diplomatic power of Vietnam, Nguyễn 
Thuật had to make concessions in response to the changing international dynam-
ics, accepting the absolute reign of an uncivilized and barbarian power.
From the precolonial Vietnamese envoys’ final voyage to China, there can be 
found the ambivalent attitude of Vietnamese politicians to experiencing the inef-
ficiency of Confucianism with regard to sustaining the long established hierarchi-
cal order of Far East powers. On the one hand, they could only privately complain 
about the Qing’s reluctance to righteously protect its vassal state. On the other 
hand, they had to publicly communicate with Qing officers with courtesy. In A 
Diary of Visiting Tianjin (1980),18 Nguyễn Thuật wrote on 31 August 1883 after 
15 Quoted from the poem “In a boat of Ming River (Ming Jiang chuan zhong 明江船中)”.
16 Quoted from the poems “Same Rhyme for Thanking Central Secretary Zhang Tangyin (Ciyun chou 
Zhongshu Zhang Tangyin 次韻酬中書張棠蔭)”, and “Same Rhyme for Thanking Li Bichang 
(Ciyun chou Li Bichang 次韻酬李必昌)”, respectively. As Yu Ping and Xiao Keyi (2018, 134) 
found, the Nguyễn court would regard an archived state, which could succeed Han cultural tradi-
tions, such as Korea, as superior to other states, such as Thailand. 
17 Both Đinh Dung (1997, 73–78) and Phạm Thị Lan (2017, 104–9) recognize this kind of author-
ization as a key Confucian tradition that Vietnam adopted to value itself and other nations. An 
unauthorized condition is the reason why Vietnam diplomatically refused to communicate with the 
Western Yi countries. 
18 As Wang Zhiqiang differentiates, A Diary of Visiting Tianjin is a private record of the Tianjin jour-
ney, unlike The Daily Record of the Qing Journey in Kiến Phúc First Year (Jianfu Yuannian Ru 
Qing Richeng 建福元年如清日程), which is an official record of the same journey that Nguyễn 
Thuật and Phạm Thận Duật cowrote for the Vietnamese emperor (Wang 2013, 57).
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learning of Emperor Tự Đức’s death and the fall of cửa Thuận An (順安汛) under 
French attack:
We are all furious. The Chinese court originally sent a document to as-
sure its willingness to mediate for the affairs between my nation and 
France. They call us to Tianjin for consultation, but have not yet held a 
talk, and also worry and hesitate about assisting us with battleships. As 
a result, France forced us to surrender while there was an incident. My 
nation is at the convergence of many changes and problems. It cannot 
but obey. How can the Chinese court that cannot protect its vessel states 
explain itself eloquently to the world? (Nguyễn 1980, 49) 
Nguyễn Thuật explicitly expressed his discontent with the Qing court, which 
was not loyal to the Confucian ethical regulations. In fact, as recorded in On 
Sino-French Vietnamese Negotiations 1875–1911 (Zhong Fa Yuenan jiaoshe 
dang 1875–1911 中法越南交涉檔 1875–1911), Li Hongzhang was personally 
conscious of the military limitations of China: “The Southern and Northern navy 
has not been trained up yet, and hence definitely cannot be sent far away. More-
over, France is good at naval battles, which Chinese battleships could not win 
actually” (Guo and Wang 1962, 713). He prioritized the probability of victory 
and the ability of the Qing government to pay, instead of traditional obligation. 
However, despite failure in achieving consensus, both the Vietnamese envoys 
and Li Hongzhang held a friendly attitude towards each other in their recorded 
communication. 
In their first and most significant meeting, Li Hongzhang first asked about the 
physical conditions of Phạm Thận Duật and his “king”:
Li: Have you recovered?
Phạm: Your subordinate has luckily 70% recovered from the poor 
disease. 
Li: How is your king? There was a document that mentioned his sick-
ness. What kind of sickness is it?
Phạm: Depending on the good fortune of the heavenly court, the king of 
the subordinate nation is good. However, as many incidents happened 
in recent years, worries caused his illness, such as coughing and feeling 
dizzy. (Guo and Wang 1962, 713–14)
This kind of warm-up conversation properly delivered intimacy and minimized 
any utilitarian perception. It also foregrounded the power-relation between China 
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and Vietnam, because Li, instead of Phạm, initiated a consolation and Phạm could 
only answer with emphasis on the inferior position of himself and his nation. 
Then they discussed two main issues: Vietnam’s secret signing of treaties with 
France and its naval defence against France’s further invasion. Concerning the 
first issue, Li Hongzhang first asked how many treaties Vietnam had signed and 
when they were signed. After Phạm Thận Duật answered that the first treaty was 
signed in 1862 and a renewal signed in 1874, Li stated: 
The treaties between vassal states and other states, such as those of 
Korea and Japan, must be reported to the heavenly court. The original 
text of the treaties shall be submitted to the Ministry of Rites (Libu 
禮部) for passing. Now all the treaties with America, Britain, and Ger-
many have to be approved by the Chinese court. I, as a senior officer, 
would send staff to the conferences, so that the conditions of the trea-
ties would be only beneficial and not disadvantageous. Your nation 
signed the treaties with France without permission, not clarifying this 
issue for the heavenly court but later sending delegates to report it. 
This apparently violates the regulation of vassal states. Ten years had 
passed. What is the use of now submitting the manuscript of the trea-
ties? (Guo and Wang 1962, 714) 
Li, as the representative of the sovereign state, blamed the Nguyễn court for late 
notification. He managed the proper diplomatic procedure of resolving interna-
tional risks, and controlled the power of negotiating with the Western powers on 
behalf of the vassal states. In response, Phạm could only politely apologize for 
the mistake, which was based on the Nguyễn’s doubts about the Qing’s military 
strength after two Opium Wars, in order to bargain for naval support: 
In those years, France was powerful and hence bullied your subordinate 
state. We urgently sought for peace and did not understand the rules for 
this new kind of incident, so we had such a violation. There is no way to 
get rid of our crime, but a hope that the heavenly court might understand 
the urgent situations, hence forgive our mistakes and emphasize our later 
goodness. If your subordinate state can be long blessed by your protec-
tion. It is the good fortune of your subordinate state. (ibid.) 
Beyond the outcome of the negotiation (Li’s implicit rejection of offering dip-
lomatic and defensive aids) and the factual development of Vietnamese-Chi-
nese-French relations, which many historians have examined in depth, the man-
ner applied in the process reveals a different kind of tension. Phạm meticulously 
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set out the ignorance, reluctance, and guilt of Vietnam, repeatedly pleasing Qing’s 
officers through stressing the superiority of the Qing and the inferiority of the 
Nguyễn with binary-opposite identification, such as “heavenly court” (tianchao 
天朝) and “subordinate state” (xiaguo 下國). This corresponds to the discourse of 
his Emperor, who repeatedly mentioned how the Qing court had protected Korea, 
a vassal state like Vietnam, against Japan and the West, and intentionally used 
words like “sympathize” (恤及), “protect (subordinate state)” (柔遠), “perceive 
morality/virtue” (感德), “benevolence” (恩德), “understand with forgiveness” 
(諒解), “great state” (大國), “vassal state” (藩屬國), “long looking-up” (久仰
之情), etc. The subordinated imperial speech held hope of recalling the legitimate 
responsibility of the Qing regime to protect Vietnam as a truly superior court, 
according to the Confucian moral hierarchy.19 In such a rhetorical context, the 
Qing representative with absolute authority was supposed to bestow good fortune 
on the poor Nguyễn through practical actions. However, the discussion ended up 
with Li Hongzhang claiming, “We can now only follow France, as the French 
do not want to discuss Vietnamese affairs with China” (Guo and Wang 1962, 
717). Phạm could only choose between discussing the matter with Li again, after 
Li’s time away for a funeral, returning to Vietnam, or talking to Zhang Gongbao 
張宮保, who was Li’s delegate. 
Conclusion
The Vietnamese envoy’s proper but implicit reminder of Confucian norms did 
not result in any substantial achievements and promises. The reason is not sim-
ply that Li could find a counterargument to imply that Vietnam’s prior violation 
of the norms led to the Qing not fulfilling its responsibility. More significantly, 
the habitual use of Confucian ethical discourse could not effectively change the 
stance of Li, who merely sought information, not opinions. Li aimed to maximize 
the benefits of the Qing, just as the Nguyễn court did during the French military 
intimidation. Both sides disregarded the Confucian requirement of faithfulness 
and righteousness but demanded that the other comply with it. Therefore, the 
determinate factor of this kind of negotiation between the sovereign state and 
vassal state, and even of the politics of the entire Far East Confucian cultural 
sphere, is the power relation that prioritized national interests from the centre to 
the peripheries, not morality. Confucianism malfunctioned, except as a degrad-
ing prerequisite for maintaining political validity. As a subordinate regime and a 
19 Refer to the letter that the Nguyễn Emperor wrote to the Qing Emperor recorded in On Sino-French 
Vietnamese Negotiations 1875–1911 (Guo and Wang 1962, 710). 
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self-recognized Confucian successor, the House of Nguyễn could only passively 
safeguard its ritual dignity, which gave no significant help to its political and dip-
lomatic plight, until its end in 1945. 
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